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This introductory chapter reviews research on future- oriented mental time travel to 
date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and 
enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future).
1.  THE PAST
In the years since Tulving first argued for episodic memory as a distinct memory 
system (Tulving, 1983), episodic memory has become a major area of research in 
psychology. Initially viewed primarily as a distinct store for information deriving 
from experienced episodes, the definition of episodic memory shifted over time, 
with researchers increasingly viewing episodic memory as a form of mental time 
travel into the personal past (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997), drawing on a range 
of recently evolved and late- developing cognitive capacities and characterized by 
a unique form of consciousness:  autonoesis, or consciousness of the self in sub-
jective time (Wheeler et al., 1997). At the same time, recognition has grown that 
mental time travel into the past cannot be understood independently of future- 
oriented mental time travel (FMTT) (Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Schacter & Addis, 
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Szpunar, 2010); indeed, FMTT may be 
primary, with our capacity to remember the past being derivative of the more basic 
capacity to imagine the future (Klein, 2013).
Research on FMTT has exploded over the past decade, with over a hundred 
articles published in just the last five years. Much of this research has revealed 
that, despite various differences in the cognitive and neural mechanisms that 
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characterize future- and past- oriented mental time travel (MTT) (for a review, see 
Schacter et al., 2007, 2012), there also exist striking similarities. For instance, peo-
ple tend to think about future and past events that are temporally near, as opposed 
to temporally distant (Spreng & Levine, 2006); temporally near events are mentally 
represented in greater detail than temporally distant events, whether those events 
are oriented toward the future or the past (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004); 
and people who are more apt to engage in mental imagery in their daily lives are 
more likely to generate detailed mental representations of the personal future and 
past (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006).
Functional neuroimaging and neuropsychological studies have provided impor-
tant insights into the close cognitive links between future- and past- oriented MTT. 
Specifically, functional neuroimaging studies have revealed that a core network of 
brain regions, sometimes referred to as the default network (Buckner et al., 2008; 
Raichle et al., 2001), become engaged when people think about their personal future 
and past (Addis et al., 2007; Okuda et al., 2003; Szpunar et al., 2007; for a recent 
review, see Benoit and Schacter, 2015). Moreover, neuropsychological observa-
tions of patients with damage to specific regions within this network have revealed 
concurrent deficits of future- and past- oriented MTT (Klein et al., 2002; Tulving, 
1985). One striking example of such overlapping deficits comes from hippocampal 
amnesia (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Patients with damage to 
the hippocampus suffer from debilitating deficits of memory, losing the ability to 
remember details about their personal past and to form new memories following 
brain damage (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001). Evidence for a concurrent deficit in 
future thinking in hippocampal amnesia suggests that memory, at least the kind of 
memory that is supported by the hippocampus, plays an important role in future 
thinking (for further details, see Addis & Schacter, 2012).
The many consistent observations arising from the cognitive neuroscience lit-
erature have led to the suggestion that an important adaptive function of human 
memory is to provide the building blocks that make up the contents of future- 
oriented cognition (Schacter & Addis, 2007), along with other modes of cognition 
that rely on memory- based processing (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; for related theo-
retical interpretations, see Hassabis & Maguire, 2007, 2009). In support of such 
claims, more recent work with healthy populations that possess underdeveloped or 
deteriorating episodic memory systems, such as younger children (Atance, 2008; 
Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; Russell et al., 2010) and older adults (Addis et al., 2008; 
Gaesser et al., 2011), has likewise shown that these individuals exhibit an impover-
ished ability to engage in future- oriented MTT. Moreover, populations that possess 
varying degrees of episodic memory impairment, such as those diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease (Addis et al., 2009), mild cognitive impairment (Gamboz et al., 
2010), schizophrenia (D’Argembeau et al., 2008), and post- traumatic stress disorder 
(Brown et al., 2013), also encounter difficulty in thinking about the future.
Ongoing research in this emerging field is focusing on delineating the extent to 
which the human brain represents temporal features of future- and past- oriented 
MTT (e.g., Nyberg et  al., 2010; de Vito et  al., 2012a, 2012b), the extent to which 
non- human animals are able to engage in FMTT (Corballis, 2013; Suddendorf, 
2013), the role of general world knowledge— also known as semantic memory— 
and its interactions with episodic memory in supporting future- oriented cognition 
(Klein, 2013; Irish & Piguet, 2013), and in further decomposing the nature of neural 
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contributions to FMTT. For instance, recent advances in neuroimaging techniques 
applied to the study of FMTT have revealed that specific regions of the default net-
work serve to represent details associated with specific components of simulated 
events (e.g., people, places, and scenarios; Hassabis et al., 2014; Szpunar, St. Jacques, 
et al., 2014). Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that various modes of thinking 
about the future can be subsumed under the overarching concept of FMTT. On 
a daily basis, people simulate events, make predictions about those events, form 
intentions, and plan for the future. Researchers are busily working to draw links 
and identify possible interactions among these various modes of future thinking.
Despite the wealth of data that has been amassed concerning FMTT and its rela-
tion to episodic memory, there nonetheless exists a lack of theoretical presuppos-
tions and implications of this research. The present volume seeks to redress this 
imbalance by including chapters that foreground conceptual questions, drawing 
on the theoretical resources of a wide range of disciplines and speaking to readers 
based in these diverse fields.
2.  THE PRESENT
The 19 contributions to the volume intersect in multiple ways, but we have grouped 
them into eight sections, determined by the following themes:  the varieties of 
future- oriented cognition; relationships between FMTT and episodic memory; 
subjective temporality in FMTT; the self in FMTT; and functional, evolutionary 
and comparative, developmental, and clinical perspectives on FMTT.
2.1.  Varieties of Future- Oriented Cognition
The bulk of the literature on FMTT so far has treated it primarily as a matter 
of episodic cognition, paying less attention to the wide variety of additional 
forms of future- oriented cognition of which we are capable. In Chapter  2, 
Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter build on their recent work (Szpunar, Spreng, 
et  al., 2014)  to situate episodic FMTT with respect to the latter, developing a 
novel taxonomy of forms of future thinking and putting it to work in an explo-
ration of interrelationships and interactions among them. Szpunar, Spreng, 
and Schacter see future thinking as falling into four basic categories: simula-
tion, prediction, intention, and planning. They argue that these four forms of 
thought interact to support our capacity to think about the future from the 
initial stage of conceiving of possible future events to the final stage of bring-
ing about the realization of a desired event. In keeping with a theme running 
through the rest of the volume, moreover, they argue that an exclusive focus on 
episodic thinking is bound to lead to an incomplete understanding of FMTT. 
Much of our future thinking is semantic in character, and they suggest that 
simulation, prediction, intention, and planning are sometimes episodic, some-
times semantic, and sometimes a hybrid of the two. Thus, for example, they 
review evidence suggesting that semantic simulation may be dissociable from 
episodic simulation, identifying future- oriented personal semantic cognition 
(Renoult et al., 2012) as a promising area for further investigation.
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Overall, their taxonomy suggests that episodic forms of simulation, prediction, 
intention, and planning are better understood than their semantic and hybrid 
counterparts and that there is a need for additional work on the latter. Many of the 
remaining contributions to the volume take important steps in this direction.
2.2.  Relationships Between Future- Oriented Mental  
Time Travel and Episodic Memory
While Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter urge us to broaden our focus to include 
semantic and hybrid forms of future- oriented cognition, research on FMTT 
grows out of research on episodic memory, and the nature of the relationship 
between FMTT and episodic memory is still not fully understood. In Chapter 3, 
Perrin delineates two broad schools of thought about this matter. Continuists 
maintain that, despite the various differences between episodic memory and 
FMTT that have been observed at the neural, cognitive, and phenomenological 
levels, they are ultimately two instances of a single general capacity for MTT. 
Discontinuists, in contrast, maintain that the differences between them are suf-
ficiently important for episodic memory and FMTT to constitute two distinct 
capacities.
Continuism is the dominant view in psychology and neuroscience, but 
Perrin himself favors discontinuism. Drawing on the philosophical literature 
on memory and mind, he identifies two apparent discontinuities between epi-
sodic memory and FMTT. The first is epistemological. Since the identities of 
the individuals involved in remembered episodes are fixed by the subject’s past 
causal interactions with them, subjects engaged in episodic memory can com-
mit errors of misidentification (Shoemaker, 1968) (i.e., they can make mistakes 
about the identities of the remembered individuals). In contrast, since the iden-
tities of the individuals involved in imagined future episodes are not fixed by 
past causal interactions, subjects engaged in FMTT cannot commit such errors. 
The second discontinuity is causal. In line with the causal theory of memory 
(Martin & Deutscher, 1966), Perrin argues that episodic memory presupposes 
a causal connection with past experiences, such that the subject who remem-
bers an event must be numerically identical to the subject who experienced it, 
whereas FMTT presupposes neither causal connection nor identity. This second 
discontinuity is reflected in a subtle but important difference at the phenomeno-
logical level: whereas, in episodic memory, autonoesis is a necessary feature of 
the process and normally results from automatic, unconscious monitoring, in 
FMTT autonoesis need not occur and, when it does, it is the result of deliberate, 
conscious inference.
If discontinuism is right, it is a mistake to treat FMTT and episodic memory 
as differing only in their respective temporal orientations, and the concept of 
MTT would at best be misleading when applied to episodic memory. Defending 
a view of episodic memory as mental time travel (Michaelian, 2016), Michaelian 
in Chapter 4 responds to arguments for both metaphysical discontinuism, which 
posits a difference in kind between episodic memory and FMTT themselves, 
and epistemological discontinuism, which posits a difference in kind between 
the knowledge of past events produced by memory and the knowledge of future 
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events produced by FMTT. Against Perrin’s argument, he maintains that epi-
sodic memory, like FMTT, does not presuppose a causal connection with the 
relevant event. Against Debus’s related argument (2014), according to which epi-
sodic memory involves a relationship to a particular past event, while FMTT 
does not involve a relationship to a particular future event, he defends a unified 
view of the objects of memory and FMTT. Finally, he maintains that any mech-
anism capable of producing autonoesis in episodic memory is likewise capa-
ble of producing autonoesis in FMTT, and vice versa, concluding, on grounds 
of parsimony, in favor of a unified account of the phenomenology of FMTT. 
Turning to epistemological discontinuism, Michaelian responds both to older 
arguments for quantitative and qualitative differences between our knowledge 
of past events and our knowledge of future events and to Perrin’s claim that 
immunity to error through misidentification is characteristic of FMTT but not 
of episodic memory; on the alternative view developed by Michaelian, immunity 
to error through misidentification is essential neither to episodic memory nor to 
FMTT, with some but not all instances of episodic memory being vulnerable to 
error through misidentification and some but not all instances of FMTT being 
immune to such error.
Continuism may receive further support from Devitt and Addis’s investi-
gation of bidirectional interactions between episodic memory and FMTT in 
Chapter  5. It is natural to focus on the ways in which imagining the future is 
shaped by remembering the past, but Devitt and Addis urge us to attend equally 
to the impact that imagining the future can have on remembering the past. 
Hence their chapter investigates both the ways in which memory contributes to 
the simulation of future events and the ways in which imagination influences 
memory. Under the former heading, they point out that, on both the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 2007) and the scene construc-
tion hypothesis (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), access to remembered information 
underwrites our capacity for phenomenologically rich simulation of both past 
and future events. Under the latter heading, they argue that the characteristics of 
imagined episodes influence both false memories of events and accurate memo-
ries of imagined events. The ability to remember the future is adaptive only given 
that imagined events are made available, through memory, for future use, and the 
encoding and retrieval of imagined events are themselves affected by the char-
acteristics of those events, including vividness, plausibility, emotional valence, 
and field versus observer perspective. When imagined events rate highly on these 
characteristics, however, they may be mistaken for memories of real events; thus 
imagination may give rise to false memory, as in imagination inflation (Garry 
et al., 1996).
The research reviewed by Devitt and Addis supports a view on which informa-
tion stored in memory makes symmetrical contributions to the process of remem-
bering the past and the process of imagining the future, with the distinction 
between remembered and imagined events being an outcome of further process-
ing by the subject. Such a view would appear to favor continuism, but the debate 
between continuists and discontinuists also depends on a number of more specific 
issues. One such issue is the role of autonoetic consciousness and subjective tem-
porality more generally in episodic memory and FMTT; this is the focus of the 
following section.
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2.3.  Subjective Temporality in Future- Oriented Mental Time Travel
Dalla Barba in Chapter 6 builds on his earlier work on memory, consciousness, 
and temporality (Dalla Barba, 2002) to argue that information stored in memory, 
while providing the raw ingredients for both remembering the past and imag-
ining the future, has no intrinsic temporal dimension; the temporal dimension 
of MTT is a further ingredient, supplied by temporal consciousness. In contrast 
to knowing consciousness, which grounds impersonal awareness of information 
about past and future events, temporal consciousness— closely related to Tulving’s 
(1985) concept of autonoetic consciousness— enables the subject to orient himself 
to his personal past and future. The absence or distortion of temporal conscious-
ness provides an elegant explanation of the patterns of confabulation observed in 
amnesic patients, with confabulation resulting from distortion of temporal con-
sciousness (due to damage to the hippocampus), while outright loss of temporal 
consciousness (due to complete destruction of the hippocampus) does not result 
in confabulation, since patients with no temporal consciousness have no capacity 
to orient themselves with respect to subjective time.
Whereas Dalla Barba sees a largely symmetrical role for temporal conscious-
ness in episodic memory and FMTT, Klein and Steindam (Chapter  7) see a 
potential asymmetry, arguing that FMTT involves a diverse range of capacities, 
only some of which depend on episodic memory and its characteristic form of 
subjective time. In line with Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter’s taxonomy, they 
argue against the assumption that FMTT stands in a privileged relationship to 
episodic memory, citing research that demonstrates the possibility of semantic 
memory- based FMTT. They argue, moreover, that this research demonstrates that 
FMTT is not characterized by a unitary form of subjective temporality. On 
their view, when FMTT does draw on episodic memory, its phenomenology is 
that of lived time: the subject has a pre- reflective sense that he is “pre- living” a 
possible future, a counterpart of the pre- reflective sense of reliving the past that 
is characteristic of episodic memory. When it draws on semantic memory, in 
contrast, the phenomenology of FMTT is that of known time, inferential rather 
than pre- reflective and experienced as impersonal rather than as pre- living 
(Klein et al., 2002). Lived time maps onto Dalla Barba’s concept of temporal con-
sciousness and Tulving’s concept of autonoetic consciousness, but known time 
maps neither onto Dalla Barba’s concept of knowing consciousness nor onto 
Tulving’s concept of noetic consciousness, since both of the latter lack a strictly 
temporal dimension. It does, however, align with the philosophical distinction 
between the A- series, in which time is experienced as flowing from future to 
past, and the B- series, in which time is experienced as a fixed before- and- after 
relationship (McTaggart, 1908). While the distinction between the A- series and 
the B- series has informed little FMTT research to date, Klein and Steindam’s 
contribution suggests that gains in conceptual clarity are to be had by taking 
both of these forms of subjective time into account.
While Dalla Barba, on the one hand, and Klein and Steindam, on the other hand, 
provide distinct accounts of subjective temporality in episodic memory and FMTT, 
they are in agreement on its centrality. De Brigard and Gessell, in contrast, call the 
centrality of subjective temporality into question in Chapter 8. Their starting point 
is the now- familiar observation that episodic memory and FMTT engage a common 
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set of brain regions, the default network. A standard explanation for this observa-
tion is the tensed content view, according to which the default network is concerned 
with simulating episodes with explicit temporal content. Against the tensed content 
view, De Brigard and Gessell invoke evidence that the default network is engaged 
not only when imagining temporally located episodes but also when imagining 
episodes with no temporal location, as well as evidence that patients with hippo-
campal amnesia have an impaired capacity to imagine episodes without an explicit 
temporal location, despite remaining capable of other forms of temporal thought. 
Their alternative explanation of the involvement of the default network in episodic 
memory, FMTT, and other forms of episodic thought is the dynamic structure view, 
which relies on the distinction between intentional contents (how a mental state 
represents something) and representational vehicles (the brain structure that real-
izes a mental state with representational content). Contents can be temporal (i.e., 
the state can have tensed content), but so can vehicles (i.e., the state can itself have 
a dynamic character), and, on their view, it is the dynamic character of the vehicles 
of episodic simulation that accounts for the involvement of the default network 
in simulating both temporally located episodes and episodes with no determinate 
temporal location. Damage to the default network would thus account for amnesic 
patients’ inability to imagine past, future, and non- temporal episodes, despite their 
preserved ability to engage in other forms of temporal thought.
While the dynamic structure view will require further investigation, De Brigard 
and Gessell suggest that it may provide a means of reconciling the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis and the scene construction hypothesis, a sugges-
tion that harmonizes with Devitt and Addis’s treatment of the relationship between 
these hypotheses.
2.4.  The Self in Future- Oriented Mental Time Travel
The dynamic structure view is friendly to the idea that FMTT may ultimately 
depend as much on semantic memory as it does on episodic memory. The role of 
semantic memory in MTT is examined in detail in Chapter 9 by Manning, who 
further links it to the role of the self. Building on a rich body of empirical and 
theoretical literature, Manning explores the relationship between, on the one 
hand, episodic and semantic forms of MTT and, on the other hand, the I- self— 
the phenomenological, knowing self— and the Me- self— the conceptual, known self 
(James, 1890). In a departure from Tulving’s (2005) influential view, which focuses 
on links between FMTT and the I- self and episodic memory, she foregrounds links 
between FMTT and the Me- self and semantic memory. The Me- self grounds the 
subject’s capacity to think of his or her personal attributes and has a conceptual, 
semantic character. Specific, episodic memories may provide constraints on what 
the Me- self can be imagined to become in the future, but semanticized information 
about the self may also provide a critical input to simulations of future events that 
are compatible with the subject’s self- knowledge. The I- self, in turn, grounds the 
subject’s capacity to project himself or herself into possible past and futures in a 
phenomenologically rich manner. Ultimately, however, there may be a sense in 
which episodic memory is primary in MTT, since, while the Me- self and semantic 
memory provide inputs to simulations of future events, Manning emphasizes that 
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the semanticized memories that feed into FMTT originate in episodic memories 
based on the I- self.
As the exchange between Perrin and Michaelian demonstrates, both the role 
of autonoetic consciousness and its determinants are controversial questions. 
D’Argembeau’s Chapter  10 is focused on the latter question, exploring the pos-
sibility that autonoesis depends not only on the subject’s simulation of an event but 
also on contextualization of the event within knowledge of the self, with knowledge 
of personal goals, in particular, playing a central role. Paralleling autobiographi-
cal knowledge of the personal past, knowledge of the personal future consists of a 
variety of components, including the representations of possible selves described 
by Manning, as well as future life periods, general events, and cultural life scripts. 
D’Argembeau argues, first, that only when they are consistent with such knowledge 
are simulations of future events experienced as belonging to the personal future. 
He argues, second, that knowledge of personal goals plays an especially central role 
here. In support of the latter claim, he adduces evidence that activating knowledge 
of personal goals is a common first step in episodic future thinking, with personal 
goals being used to guide simulation of events, that memories of simulated future 
episodes are more easily accessed when they are relevant to personal goals, and that 
autobiographical knowledge plays a role in linking and organizing representations 
of specific future episodes, as well as neuroimaging evidence supporting the link 
between FMTT and goal processing. In support of the former claim, he reviews 
evidence that the importance of a simulated future event with respect to personal 
goals contributes to the involvement of autonoesis in FMTT.
In addition to reinforcing the plausibility of the claim that semantic memory 
makes critical contributions to FMTT, Manning’s and D’Argembeau’s discus-
sions of the role of the self resonate with the suggestion— made in a number of 
contributions in subsequent sections— that FMTT may have much of its beneficial 
impact on future- directed decision- making via its interaction with the subject’s 
personal goals.
2.5.  Functional Perspectives
In one of several chapters to discuss the impact of FMTT on future- directed 
decision- making, Debus, in an exploration of the nature and the value of FMTT in 
Chapter 11, cautions that it may in fact have both benefits and costs. Beginning with 
the nature of FMTT, she echoes De Brigard and Gessell’s observation that, in addi-
tion to imagining future events, subjects can imagine past events, present events, 
and events with no determinate temporal location, arguing that imagining future 
events differs from imagining events of these other types, first, in that the imagined 
event is subjectively located in the future (the “specific temporal orientation” claim) 
and, second, in that the future (unlike the past or the present) is, in an important 
sense, open (the “openness” claim). Rejecting interpretations of the specific tempo-
ral orientation claim on which future- orientation is a matter of temporal phenom-
enology, Debus argues, in line with D’Argembeau’s approach, that it is determined 
by the occurrence of the event in the context of relevant future- directed beliefs. 
Rejecting both metaphysical and epistemological interpretations of the openness 
claim, Debus argues that the openness of the future is to be understood in agential 
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terms, in the sense that the subject himself or herself is in principle able to affect 
the occurrence of the event in question. Turning from the nature of FMTT to its 
value, Debus argues that the value of imagining future events lies in the effect that 
doing so can have on their realization, in part by motivating the subject to bring 
them about. But she also notes that FMTT can in some cases have an opposite, 
demotivating effect.
In contrast to Debus’s focus on the impact of FMTT itself, Hoerl and McCormack 
focus in Chapter 12 on the function of episodic memory in future- oriented decision- 
making. Though there is little consensus in the literature on the function of epi-
sodic memory, there is increasing agreement that its function is in some important 
sense future- oriented. Hoerl and McCormack’s key insight is that the function of 
episodic memory may be future- oriented, not merely in the sense that it provides 
the raw ingredients for the simulation of future events, but also in the sense that it is 
a prerequisite for the ability to feel the emotion of regret (e.g., over how a given past 
event might have turned out differently had one chosen differently), hence shaping 
decisions (e.g., by leading one to choose differently on future occasions). Picking 
up on recent work on the role of regret in decision- making, they argue that regret 
may have an impact on future choices both by motivating one to choose differ-
ently when faced with similar choices and, more generally, by motivating one not to 
miss opportunities. Considering how episodic memory might underlie the ability 
to experience regret, Hoerl and McCormack argue that experiencing regret presup-
poses the ability to mentally project oneself into a particular past situation, as well 
as to understand that the situation might have unfolded differently than it did in 
fact. Considering how episodic memory might underlie the ability to anticipate 
regret, they argue that anticipating regret presupposes the ability to project one-
self forward into a possible future situation, as well as the ability to imagine one’s 
future self looking back on— remembering— one’s present decision. That regret 
presupposes episodic memory in both of these ways is supported by the research 
on episodic counterfactual thinking discussed by De Brigard and Gessell, as well 
as research on the loss of ability to experience regret in episodic amnesia. Having 
made a case for the view that episodic memory is a prerequisite for the ability to 
feel regret, Hoerl and McCormack argue that regret is indeed involved in adaptive 
decision- making, since there is no simpler alternative mechanism that might play 
the same role.
Like Debus, Pezzulo focuses directly on FMTT in Chapter 13. His aim, how-
ever, is to situate FMTT in the context of a broader future- oriented perspective on 
cognition as a whole in order to shed light on the relationship between MTT and 
predictive processing. There is increasing consensus that the brain is functionally 
oriented toward the future, constantly generating short- term and longer- term pre-
dictions. As illustrated by research on internally generated sequences in the rodent 
hippocampus— which enable rodents not only to revisit spatial paths that they 
have actually taken but also to explore counterfactual and possible future paths— 
predictive processing requires the brain to self- generate information, as opposed to 
extracting it from sensory stimuli. Pezzulo speculates that such internally gener-
ated dynamics, which require an ability to detach from the agent’s current context, 
might underlie more sophisticated forms of detached cognition, including past- 
and future- oriented MTT and episodic counterfactual thought. A  link between 
simpler forms of predictive processing and more sophisticated forms of episodic 
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cognition could shed light on the evolution of MTT by showing how the latter, 
highly complex capacity might have emerged on the basis of considerably simpler 
capacities. With respect to the adaptive benefits of phenomenologically rich FMTT, 
in particular, Pezzulo suggests that the sense of “pre- experiencing” that is charac-
teristic of FMTT might enable the subject not only to anticipate the outcomes of 
future decisions but also to evaluate them in the here and now by anticipating his 
or her own future evaluative responses.
The three chapters in this section contribute to our increasingly sophisticated 
functional understanding of FMTT. As Pezzulo’s chapter suggests, however, func-
tion can only be fully understood from an evolutionary perspective, and the chap-
ters in the following section turn to the evolution of our capacity for FMTT.
2.6.  Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives
Thom and Clayton in Chapter  14 review the ongoing debate over MTT in ani-
mals. In the debate so far, the main challenge for partisans of animal MTT has 
been to identify clear counterexamples to the Bischof- Köhler hypothesis, accord-
ing to which animals cannot anticipate future needs that differ from present needs 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). Identifying such counterexamples is problematic 
due to the difficulty of ruling out the possibility that apparently future- oriented 
behavior is in fact governed by current drive states. Seeking to resolve this diffi-
culty, proponents of animal MTT have employed ingenious experiments to provide 
evidence of FMTT in great apes, other primates, and birds, but the evidence so far 
remains inconclusive. Rather than seeking further evidence of the same sort, Thom 
and Clayton suggest that the lack of firm conclusions in this area may in part reflect 
the limitations of the Bischof- Köhler hypothesis itself, arguing that consideration 
of the case of human FMTT shows that dissociating from current needs is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for engaging in FMTT. As opposed to looking at the evolu-
tionary emergence of the capacity for MTT as a whole, they maintain, we would do 
better to focus on the emergence of the more specific cognitive capacities that give 
rise to it— if these, taken individually, have adaptive benefits, it becomes increas-
ingly plausible to see animal and human MTT as continuous.
A similarly optimistic take on animal MTT is developed by Martin- Ordas in 
Chapter 15. Focusing on autonoesis, she points out that treating the presence of 
autonoetic phenomenology as a criterion for MTT makes it difficult to determine 
whether non- human animals, who cannot provide verbal reports on their phenom-
enology, are capable of MTT in the same sense as humans. Guided by the Bischof- 
Köhler hypothesis, researchers have therefore focused on criteria such as flexibility, 
learning from single experiences, and the absence of relevant stimuli in the pres-
ent environment. Building on some of the same studies discussed by Thom and 
Clayton, Martin- Ordas similarly argues both that there is some evidence for MTT 
in animals and that the Bischof- Köhler hypothesis has important limitations. But 
whereas Thom and Clayton argue that dissociation from current needs is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for FMTT, Martin- Ordas argues that tests based on the 
hypothesis presuppose distinctions between episodic and semantic memory and 
between memory and foresight, which may ultimately be less than clear. In light 
of these points, standard criticisms of evidence for MTT in animals— especially 
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great apes— begin to look less convincing. Martin- Ordas does not deny that human 
MTT is considerably more complex than animal MTT. But, adopting an anthropo-
logical perspective, she does suggest that this additional complexity might derive 
not from autonoesis but rather from semantic knowledge, since human planning, 
especially long- term planning, often depends less on episodic than on semantic 
knowledge. Much of the latter, in turn, is intergenerationally transmitted, open-
ing up the possibility of cultural variability in FMTT. Thus Martin- Ordas suggests 
that, in addition to investigating similarities and differences between FMTT in ani-
mals and in humans, we investigate similarities and differences between FMTT in 
different human populations.
Like Martin- Ordas, Corballis (Chapter  16) is optimistic with respect to ani-
mal MTT, even while calling our attention to the unique features of human MTT. 
Drawing on some of the same research on the rat hippocampus cited by Pezzulo, 
Corballis suggests that at least basic forms of MTT may not be unique to humans, 
indeed that they may go far back in evolution. Human MTT, however, is clearly 
more complex than any form of MTT for which we have evidence in animals, in 
part because it is linked to more general forms of mind wandering, which greatly 
augment the powers of MTT, allowing us to anticipate not only likely future events 
but also a much broader range of possible events, thus preparing ourselves for the 
unexpected. Mind wandering overlaps with theory of mind, which in turn is a pre-
requisite for linguistic communication, since language use requires us to anticipate 
the mental states of others. And language, in turn, allows us to share the results 
of our mind wandering, which we do primarily through storytelling. It may ulti-
mately be the link with storytelling that is the most distinctive feature of human 
MTT; indeed, the emergence of the capacity for storytelling may have marked a 
key step in human evolution (Scalise Sugiyama, 2011). Thus the overall message 
that emerges from Corballis’s contribution, as well as the other contributions in 
this section, is that, while there may be precursors of MTT in other species, human 
MTT has important unique features.
2.7.  Developmental Perspectives
Studying MTT in animals presents many of the same challenges as studying it 
in children. Bridging evolutionary and developmental perspectives, Suddendorf, 
Brinums, and Imuta in Chapter 17 investigate the role of FMTT in enabling the 
subject to shape his or her future self through the deliberate practice of motor skills. 
They point out that, while the improvement of such skills depends on changes to 
procedural systems, practice that results in changes can itself be triggered by imag-
ining a future self with improved skills. There are controversies over the role of 
deliberate practice in enabling subjects to achieve the highest levels of performance, 
but it is clear that practice is an important factor in enabling us to achieve some 
level of improvement in our performance in various areas. Similarly, there are 
controversies over the ability of non- human animals to engage in FMTT, but it is 
clear that flexible, long- term foresight is restricted to humans. Hence the improve-
ment of motor skills through deliberate practice is likely to be uniquely human. 
Indeed, Suddendorf, Brinums, and Imuta argue that deliberate practice, enabled 
by FMTT, might well have been a prerequisite for the emergence, in evolutionary 
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time, of recognizably human culture, given that it is critical to the characteristically 
human ability to specialize in order to respond to shifting environmental demands 
(and to reshape the environment itself). Turning from evolution to development, 
Suddendorf, Brinums, and Imuta describe the gradual emergence of deliberate 
practice in children through the development of the multiple capacities that it pre-
supposes, suggesting that the building blocks of deliberate practice are in place 
around the time children start formal schooling. Finally, they describe an initial 
study (Davis et al., in press) on the development of deliberate practice in children, 
which provides some confirming evidence for this suggestion.
A more general take on FMTT in children is provided in Chapter 18 by Atance 
and Mahy, who review both verbal and behavioral approaches to studying chil-
dren’s capacity to mentally project into the future. Verbal methods have provided 
evidence that, while they are able to anticipate the future, 3- year- olds have diffi-
culty accurately anticipating the future. Due to concerns about the appropriateness 
of using verbal methods with children who have an imperfect grasp of the mean-
ings of temporal terms, researchers have also investigated FMTT in children using 
behavioral methods— akin to those used to study MTT in non- human animals— 
inspired by Tulving’s (2005) “spoon test,” which requires the subject to act now in 
anticipation of a situation likely to be faced in the future. Such behavioral meth-
ods have provided evidence that memory limitations— the inability to remember 
relevant past information— may account for children’s failures in some episodic 
future thinking tasks, and there is indeed evidence for a correlation between chil-
dren’s ability to think about the past and their ability to think about the future. 
In addition to episodic memory, however, the development of theory of mind and 
executive function may be important to explaining the development of FMTT in 
children. As there is little developmental work on the contributions of these factors, 
this remains an important area for future research.
2.8.  Clinical Perspectives
Insights into the nature and mechanisms of FMTT can be gleaned not only from 
comparisons between humans and non- human animals and between adults and 
children, but also from comparisons between clinical and non- clinical populations. 
The final two contributions to the volume present clinical perspectives on FMTT.
Integrating findings on FMTT in clinical populations with functional neuro-
imagining studies of FMTT in healthy individuals, Irish in Chapter 19 examines 
the pivotal role played by semantic memory in FMTT. Going back to Tulving’s foun-
dational work (Tulving, 1972), semantic memory has been understood as lacking a 
conscious temporal dimension, and the standard view is that episodic memory, via 
autonoetic consciousness, provides the essential foundation for MTT into both past 
and future. There is, however, mounting evidence of significant interplay between 
episodic and semantic memory (e.g., overlap between the semantic memory system 
and the core network). Moreover, semantic representations, which are abstracted 
from multiple experiences, are more flexible and hence well suited to projection 
into future contexts; indeed, due to the lesser flexibility of episodic representations, 
it is plausible that semantic memory may not only facilitate FMTT but may even 
be essential to it. Irish therefore argues that we should expect to find that semantic 
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memory makes important contributions to FMTT. After briefly reviewing relevant 
neuroimagining evidence, she turns to studies of amnesia and semantic dementia, 
which show that patients with episodic amnesia may be capable of temporal con-
sciousness based on semantic memory, whereas patients with semantic dementia 
have impaired FMTT despite preserved episodic memory. These findings support 
the semantic scaffolding hypothesis, according to which semantic knowledge pro-
vides the framework enabling simulation of past and future events (Irish & Piguet, 
2013). The semantic scaffolding hypothesis, in turn, fits with the taxonomy devel-
oped by Szpunar, Spreng, and Schacter in Chapter 2, which situates episodic and 
semantic forms of FMTT as points on a continuum.
In Chapter 20, Ernst and Manning review the findings of behavioral and neu-
roimaging studies of FMTT impairments in multiple sclerosis (MS) patients. MS 
is accompanied by a variety of cognitive impairments, and Ernst and Manning 
argue that there is indeed a neural and cognitive basis for FMTT impairment 
in MS, ruling out a psychological basis on the ground that similar patterns of 
impairment are observed in MS patients in both FMTT and autobiographical 
memory. A comparison of FMTT impairments in MS patients and FMTT impair-
ments in other clinical populations leads them to suggest that MS primarily affects 
the early stages of the process of simulating future events, with patients having 
difficulty extracting and recombining details into novel and coherent events. At 
the structural level, they argue that the impairments result from changes to a 
widespread brain network, consistent with the diffuse nature of the brain lesions 
characteristic of MS. Finally, they turn to strategies for improving autobiographi-
cal memory functioning to assess the possibilities for cognitive rehabilitation of 
FMTT in MS patients, finding that the use of mental visual imagery provides a 
particularly promising means of improving not only autobiographical memory 
but also FMTT.
3.  THE FUTURE
What is likely to come next in FMTT research? Collectively, the contributions to 
this volume identify a number of promising areas for future research.
• The diversity of FMTT: There are important differences and complex inter-
actions among different forms of FMTT. Future research is unlikely to 
focus only on episodic forms of FMTT or to assume that episodic memory 
is necessarily involved in every form of FMTT. In particular, we are likely 
to see more research on the contribution of semantic memory to FMTT 
and on semantic and hybrid forms of FMTT.
• The basis of MTT: Restricting our attention to episodic MTT, there are 
arguments both in favor of the primacy of episodic memory and in 
favor of the primacy of FMTT. This question is particularly thorny, as it 
intersects in complex ways with comparative, developmental, and clinical 
questions.
• Subjective temporality: Multiple frameworks for understanding tempo-
ral phenomenology are on offer; it is unclear to what extent these can 
be reconciled. More broadly, it remains to be seen whether the temporal 
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dimension of MTT is to be understood primarily in terms of phenomenol-
ogy, content, or representational vehicles.
• The self and time: Both the self and time are usually viewed as being essen-
tial to FMTT. It is becoming increasingly evident that there are multiple 
forms of self and multiple forms of time that might be involved in MTT, 
and there are arguments for viewing neither the self nor time as being 
essential to the basic capacity underlying MTT. Untangling the relations 
among the various forms of MTT, self, and time is likely to be an espe-
cially challenging theoretical task.
• Function and evolution of MTT: A range of costs and benefits of FMTT 
have been identified, and many competing explanations of the evolution 
of FMTT have been proposed; it remains to be seen to what extent these 
accounts can be reconciled with each other.
• Components of FMTT: The relationship of FMTT to more basic forms 
of future- oriented cognition is another area that will feed back into our 
evolutionary understanding of the capacity. Evolutionary, developmental, 
and clinical studies are also increasingly taking into account the way in 
which various more fine- grained cognitive capacities interact to give rise 
to the capacity for the kind of FMTT we find in adult humans. This might 
represent a way out of the impasse over MTT in non- human animals.
In our view, three general points should be kept in mind going forward. First, 
while FMTT has often been taken to be a general neurocognitive capacity whose 
different manifestations are largely a function of situational and motivational 
contingencies, there are conceptual and empirical difficulties for this view. The 
contributions to the volume suggest that FMTT has a number of distinct neuro-
cognitive underpinnings and that the diversity of its empirical presentation is 
not merely superficial variation resulting from task demands; rather, it reflects 
the fact that there is not a single, uniform capacity for FMTT— there are different 
ways of imagining the future, underwritten by distinct mechanisms. Compare, 
for example, imagining what one will do tomorrow with imagining what will 
happen on a camping trip with imagining what one will be like in 10 years. These 
and other forms of FMTT may be only loosely related in virtue of their con-
cern with possible futures. Research on FMTT has often assumed that episodic 
memory is the common factor that lends an underlying unity to this apparent 
diversity. But, as a number of the contributors argue, this assumption is increas-
ingly ill supported. At this stage, a possibility deserving of serious consideration 
is that the treatment of FMTT as a unified psychological faculty is largely a matter 
of methodological convenience, together with a desire for theoretical parsimony. 
While parsimony is a laudable goal in theory construction, it may nevertheless 
turn out to be the case that the search for a common mechanism underlying the 
various forms of FMTT is futile.
Second, as a number of the chapters in this volume indicate, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that greater consideration is needed of those aspects of con-
sciousness that enable retrieved mental content to be imagined and considered with 
respect to its implications for future behavior. It remains to be seen whether this is 
Tulving’s autonoetic consciousness, Dalla Barba’s temporal consciousness, or Klein 
and Steindam’s lived temporality, but it is likely to be the case that no single form of 
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subjective temporality can account for all FMTT in its various manifestations. The 
sooner we begin sustained investigation of the conscious processes that enable us to 
transcend the present, the sooner we will come to terms with exactly what it means 
to engage in the act of mental time travel.
Finally, we suggest caution with respect to the tendency to assume that empiri-
cal studies are sufficient by themselves to shed light on the nature of FMTT. The 
history of psychological science suggests that the mere accumulation of data, often 
in support of very local theories, has sometimes stood in for the development of 
more global understanding of the phenomena in question. If they are to be fully 
appreciated, the diverse phenomena constituting acts of FMTT need to be securely 
situated in a broader understanding of the workings of the mind. It is our hope that 
the present volume moves us significantly closer to this goal.
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